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Abstract 
This paper constructs an open economy Kaleckian model in which international competition 
affects the bargaining process between firms and workers, and investigates the effects of such 
bargaining on the macroeconomy. We show that the effects of a change in the bargaining 
power on aggregate demand depends not only on the demand regimes but also on which 
agents bears more of the burden arising from the international price competition. Moreover, if 
the real exchange rate has a small impact on the trade balance, the economy is stable, whereas 
if it has a larger impact on the trade balance, the economy is unstable. 
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Thus far, a number of Kaleckian models have been developed, and the relation between 
income distribution and aggregate demand has been investigated.1 From those models, we 
derived a familiar result that there are two types of demand regime, wage-led and profit-led, 
according to the parameter constellation of investment and saving functions.2 The wage-led 
demand regime indicates an economy in which a rise in the profit share decreases aggregate 
demand and the profit-led demand regime indicates an economy in which a rise in the profit 
share increases aggregate demand. 
 Most of the Kaleckian models that investigate the relation between income distribution and 
aggregate demand assume a closed economy and abstract from international trade. The real 
economy is nevertheless an open economy, and accordingly there are complications in 
applying analytical results based on the assumption of a closed economy to the real world. It is 
necessary to construct an open economy model and derive effective implications for the real 
economy. 
 Needless to say, some of the Kaleckian models take into account an open economy case.3 A 
pioneering work that introduces international price competition into the Kaleckian model is 
Blecker (1989). By adding net export into demand components, he shows that an increase in 
the wage share can lower international price competitiveness and has a negative impact on 
investment, which implies that the wage-led demand regime is hard to obtain. Another novel 
idea of Blecker (1989) is the assumption that firms restrain their prices in terms of 
international price competition, whereas traditional Kaleckian models assume that firms 
determine their price as they like. This modification implies that international competition 
strictly affects income distribution in the domestic country. 
 Blecker (1989) nevertheless assumes that the measure of international price competition 
(i.e., the ratio of domestic unit labor cost to import prices) is exogenously given and hence 
                                                 
1 For the so-called Kaleckian model, see Rowthorn (1981) and Lavoie (1992). As for the empirical studies 
on the relation between income distribution and aggregate demand based on the Kaleckian framework, see 
Stockhammer and Onaran (2004), Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006), Naastepad and Storm (2007), Hein 
and Vogel (2008), Stockhammer, Onaran, and Ederer (2009), and Stockhammer, Hein, and Grafl (2011). 
2 For a theoretical explanation of the demand regime, see Blecker (2002). 
3  Cordero (2002) constructs an open economy Kaleckian model that integrates the theory of 
conflicting-claims inflation. This model assumes, however, that price is determined in the international 
goods market and formalizes only workers’ bargaining process. La Marca (2010), using an open economy 
version of the stock-flow consistent model, considers the dynamics of the rate of capacity utilization, profit 
share, and trade balance. Von Arnim (2011) constructs an open economy Kaleckian model and considers the 
effect of the wage policy on growth and distribution by using Monte Carlo simulation. 
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does not explicitly consider the process in which international competition influences income 
distribution. We therefore need to endogenize income distribution to improve the open 
economy model. 
 A representative way to endogenize the process of income distribution in a Kaleckian model 
is to use the theory of conflicting-claims inflation developed by Rowthorn (1977).4 This 
theory assumes that both firms and workers have their own target values of each distributive 
share and then negotiate over the price and the nominal wage in response to the gap between 
the actual share and their own targets. 
 The Cassetti (2002) model is one that takes into account the open economy case using the 
theory of conflicting-claims inflation. He considers the situation in which inflation of 
domestic products due to class conflict changes the real exchange rate, and this change affects 
the growth rate of the economy through exports and imports. His model is important in that it 
simultaneously introduces international price competition and the determination of income 
distribution. 
 Cassetti’s (2002) model nevertheless leaves room for further investigation. When extending 
a Kaleckian model with conflict-inflation to an open economy model, he uses equations that 
determine the wage and price dynamics in closed economy without any modifications. In 
other words, he assumes that in the face of international price competition in the international 
goods market, firms and workers never consider foreign competition, which is unrealistic. To 
investigate income distribution in an open economy, we must consider the effect of 
international price competition on the conflict between firms and workers. 
 A study that considers this aspect is Missaglia (2007). He assumes that the price equation of 
firms depends on the real exchange rate; when the terms of trade deteriorate, firms restrain 
their prices. Missaglia’s (2007) approach is still unsatisfactory because he does not consider 
the effect of international price competition on the wage bargaining of workers. The same 
problem holds for Blecker (1998), which is an extension of Blecker (1989). 
 With the ongoing globalization of the real world, just as firms have to consider international 
competition in setting their prices, workers also have to consider international competition in 
formulating their wage demands. Increasing wages recklessly in open economy causes a 
decrease in the price competitiveness of the domestic industry and a decline in market share 
                                                 
4 For closed economy Kaleckian models with the theory of conflicting-claims inflation, see Cassetti (2003) 
and Dutt (1987). 
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on the international market, which in turn causes a fall in domestic labor demand and leads to 
a loss of employment. In addition, if international capital flow is allowed, firms facing losses 
due to international price competition transfer their production base to foreign countries to 
seek cheaper labor. Accordingly, the pressure on domestic workers will intensify. It is 
therefore reasonable to suppose that workers who engage in wage bargaining pay attention to 
the relative price of domestic and foreign products.5 
 When both firms and workers consider international price competition, the effect of price 
pressure on income distribution has two channels. Whether the wage share or the profit share 
increases when international competition intensifies depends on how much firms and workers 
share the burden arising from price restraint. 
 The Blecker (2011) model accordingly assumes that international price competition affects 
both firms and workers. In this model, the target profit share of firms depends on the real 
exchange rate, and moreover, the rate of change in the nominal wage that is determined by 
wage bargaining depends on the real exchange rate. In his approach, however, the target profit 
share of workers is assumed to be constant. It is because the price of imports is indexed to the 
nominal wage and not because the international price competition affects the target of workers 
that changes in the real exchange rate affect the nominal wage. As stated above, however, it is 
possible that under severe international competition, labor unions revise the target downward. 
It is therefore necessary to build a conflict model that considers this possibility. 
 In addition, the Blecker (2011) model separates the determination of output (capacity 
utilization) from the determination of income distribution and the real exchange rate. In other 
words, the goods market has nothing to do with the profit share and the real exchange rate that 
are determined in the labor market; there is a feedback from the labor market to the goods 
market, but not from the goods market to the labor market. 
 In the present paper, we therefore present a Kaleckian model in which international price 
competition affects both firms’ decision and workers’ decisions. In addition, there is bilateral 
feedback from the labor market to the goods market and from the goods market to the labor 
market.6 Using this model, we investigate the stability of the steady state equilibrium and the 
                                                 
5 For a model that assumes the effect of international price competition on the wage bargaining of workers, 
see Blecker (1996). He also introduces a real world example that supports this assumption: the labor union 
of Xerox Corporation accepts a sharp wage cut to prevent workers from moving abroad in the face of 
international price competition. 
6 At the steady state equilibrium of our model, the rate of inflation is constant. Accordingly, the equilibrium 
rate of capacity utilization can be called the “Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Utilization.” As long as we 
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effect of international price competition on the equilibrium values. From our analysis, we 
obtain the following new results. 
 First, with regard to the stability of the equilibrium, as long as the effect of the real 
exchange rate on trade balance is sufficiently small, the equilibrium is likely to be stable 
irrespective of which demand regime is realized in the equilibrium. By contrast, if the real 
exchange rate effect is large, then the equilibrium is likely to be unstable, and depending on 
conditions, cyclical fluctuations can occur. 
 Second, with regard to the comparative static analysis, even if the domestic economy is 
characterized by a profit-led demand regime, unlike in a closed economy, a rise in the 
bargaining power of firms can depress the rate of capacity utilization. Moreover, even if the 
domestic economy is characterized by a wage-led demand regime, unlike in a closed economy, 
a rise in the bargaining power of workers can depress the rate of capacity utilization. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 
investigates the dynamics of the model. Section 4 conducts comparative static analysis. 
Section 5 is the conclusion. 
 
2. Model 
Consider a small open economy in which workers and capitalists coexist. Workers consume all 
their wages and capitalists save a fraction s  of their profits. Workers and capitalists consume 
both domestic and foreign goods. The goods market is imperfectly competitive, and hence, 
firms set prices according to a mark-up pricing rule. Moreover, firms have an investment 
function independent of savings. The capital stock and investment consist only of domestic 
goods. 
 
2.1 Dynamics of the capacity utilization 
                                                                                                                                                          
identify the rate of capacity utilization with the rate of employment, we can regard  u1  as the 
“Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU),” where u denotes the equilibrium value of 
the rate of capacity utilization. The equilibrium rate of capacity utilization depends on both the bargaining 
power of workers and that of firms. For example, an increase in the bargaining power of workers either 
positively or negatively affects the NAIRU. This result is similar to the results obtained in Storm and 
Naastepad (2007) and Naastepad and Storm (2010), and stands in marked contrast to the mainstream 
NAIRU view, which implies that deregulation of labor market and resultant reduction in the bargaining 
power of workers is necessary for lowering the rate of unemployment. However, strictly speaking, the rate 
of capacity utilization and the rate of employment are different variables, and hence, we need to build a 
model in which the rate of employment is an endogenous variable if we want to find the NAIRU. 
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Suppose that firms operate with a fixed coefficient production function. The ratio of potential 
output FY  to the capital stock K  is assumed to be constant. We can then write the rate of 
capacity utilization as KYu / , where Y  denotes actual output.7 From this, we have 
ur  , where r  and   denote the profit rate and profit share, respectively. 
 Following Marglin and Bhaduri (1990), we assume that the firms’ investment function is 
increasing in both the rate of capacity utilization and profit share: 
   0,0),,(   ddud ggugK
I , (1) 
where dug  denotes the partial derivative with respect to the rate of capacity utilization and 
dg  the partial derivative with respect to the profit share. 
 Let us specify consumption demand. Total domestic consumption demand consists of 
demand for domestic goods and foreign goods. First, we assume that total nominal 
consumption of domestic goods is a fraction   of total nominal consumption expenditure. 
   ])1([)( rpKswECCp Dc
D
w   , (2) 
where p  denotes the price of domestic goods, DwC  workers’ real consumption of domestic 
goods, DcC  capitalists’ real consumption of domestic goods, w  the nominal wage, and E  
employment. Next, we assume that total nominal consumption of foreign goods (i.e., total 
nominal imports) is a fraction 1  of total nominal consumption expenditure. 
   ])1()[1()( rpKswECCep Mc
M
w
f   , (3) 
where e  denotes the nominal exchange rate in terms of home currency, fp  the price of 
foreign goods that is exogenously given, MwC  workers’ real consumption of foreign goods, 
and McC  capitalists’ real consumption of foreign goods. 
 Following Cassetti (2002), we assume that the expenditure coefficient for domestic goods is 
a function of the real exchange rate pep f / . 
   ,1)(0),(    (4) 
where fp  denotes the price of foreign goods. How the expenditure coefficient changes when 
the real exchange rate changes depends on the elasticity of substitution   between domestic 
goods and foreign goods. If   is less than unity, then   is a decreasing function of  . On 
                                                 
7 The rate of capacity utilization is defined as FYY / . Since we have )//()/(/ FF YKKYYY  , we 
can use KY /  as the rate of capacity utilization as long as FYK /  is technologically fixed and constant. 
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the other hand, if   is more than unity, then   is an increasing function of  . 
 We specify demand for exports. Nominal exports equal real exports multiplied by the price 
of domestic goods. We assume that real exports are increasing in both the real exchange rate 
and foreign real incomes fY . 
   0,)(),(  xeYKexpYEXpEXp ff  , (5) 
where )(ex  denotes real exports per capital stock. For simplicity, we assume that real 
exports are linear in foreign real incomes.8 
 The goods market clearing condition leads to 










)( , (6) 





D CCC   and that of foreign goods McMwM CCC  , and M  denotes imports. Note 
that MC M  . Dividing both sides of equation (6) by pK and substituting equations (2), (3), 
(4), and (5) in the resultant expression, we obtain 
 fd Yexsuuug )()()](1[),(   . (7) 
Equation (7) is a condition that holds in the equilibrium of the goods market. However, the 
equilibrium of the goods market is not instantaneously attained. If we denote the right-hand 
side of equation (7) as sg , the excess demand of the goods market is given by sd gg  . Here, 
for simplicity, we assume that fY  is constant and unity. 
 We assume that in the goods market, quantity adjustment prevails. 
 0),(   sd ggu , (8) 
where   denotes the speed of adjustment of the goods market. Equation (8) shows that 
excess demand leads to a rise in the rate of capacity utilization, while excess supply leads to a 
decline in the rate of capacity utilization. Substituting equation (1) and the right-hand side of 
equation (7) in equation (8), we obtain the dynamics of the rate of capacity utilization. 
                                                 
8  In our specification, the income elasticity of export demand is unity. On the other hand, in 
balance-of-payments-constrained growth models, originally founded by Thirlwall (1979), the sizes of the 
income elasticities of export and import demands are important in determining the rate of economic growth. 
However, as discussed below, we assume that foreign incomes fY  is constant. Therefore, the size of the 
income elasticity of export demand does not affect our results. 
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    )()()](1[),(  exsuuugu d  . (9) 
 
2.2 Dynamics of the profit share 





 , (10) 
where xxx /ˆ   denotes the rate of change in a variable x  and a  the level of labor 
productivity. In this subsection, we specify each term on the right-hand side of equation (10). 
 We specify changes in the domestic price and the nominal wage by using Rowthorn’s 
(1977) conflicting-claims theory of inflation. First, suppose that firms set their price to close 
the gap between their target profit share f  and the actual profit share. Second, suppose that 
the growth rate of the nominal wage that workers manage to negotiate depends on the gap 
between their target profit share w  and the actual profit share. 
   ,0,0,10,0,0),;(),(ˆ  ffffffffp    (11) 
 0,0,10,0,0,0),;,(),(ˆ  wwwwuwwwww uw    (12) 
where   and   are shift parameters, and denote the bargaining power of firms and that of 
workers, respectively. The parameters f  and w  are the adjustment speed of the price and 
that of the nominal wage, respectively. 
 In our model, the two target profit shares are determined endogenously. 
 First, we assume that the target profit share of firms is an increasing function of the real 
exchange rate ( 0 f ). This means that domestic firms set their price by considering 
international price competition with foreign firms. When the price competitiveness of 
domestic firms lowers, domestic firms cut their target profit share and hence their prices to 
defend their market share in the international goods market. 
 Second, we assume that the target profit share of workers is decreasing in both the real 
exchange rate and the rate of capacity utilization ( 0 w  and 0wu ). An increase in the 
price of the domestic goods has a negative effect on employment and workers thus set their 
target profit share considering the price decrease. When the real exchange rate decreases and 
price competitiveness worsens, workers therefore compromise to raise the target profit share. 
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We can identify an increase in the rate of capacity utilization with an increase in the rate of 
employment. When the rate of employment increases, workers’ attitude in bargaining becomes 
strong, leading them to seek a higher target wage share, that is, a lower target profit share. 
This is known as the “reserve army effect.” 
 Third, we assume that the target profit share of firms is increasing in the bargaining power 
of firms ( 0 f ) and that the target profit share of workers is decreasing in the bargaining 
power of workers ( 0 w ). 
 The growth rate of labor productivity is determined endogenously. Here, we assume that 
labor productivity growth is an increasing function of the rate of capacity utilization. 
   0),(ˆ  aa guga  (13) 
This specification is similar to the “reserve-army creation effect” described in Sasaki (2011, 
2012), where the growth rate of labor productivity is an increasing function of the rate of 
employment. If the rate of employment is positively related with the rate of capacity 
utilization,9 that is, if Okun’s law holds, we can use capacity utilization in place of the 
employment rate (Tavani, Flaschel, and Taylor, 2011). As the rate of employment (capacity 
utilization) increases and the labor market tightens, the bargaining power of workers increases, 
which exerts an upward pressure on wages, leading capitalists to adopt labor-saving technical 
changes. In other words, capitalists intentionally create unemployment (Bhaduri, 2006; Dutt, 
2006; Flaschel and Skott, 2006; Sasaki, 2010, 2011). 
 Substituting equations (11), (12), and (13) in equation (10), we obtain the dynamics of the 
profit share. 
   )()];,([]);([
1
ugu awwff  
 . (14) 
 
2.3 Dynamics of the real exchange rate 
We specify the dynamics of the real exchange rate. The rate of change in the real exchange is 
given as 
                                                 
9 In the short-run, it is reasonable to think that the rate of capacity utilization and the rate of employment 
move in the same direction. However, in the long-run, as an anonymous referee correctly points out, these 
two variables are different, and so, we should consider the dynamics of the two variables separately. If we 
separate the dynamics of the two variables, as the closed economy models of Sasaki (2010, 2013) show, the 
number of differential equations increases, and so, analysis gets more complicated. Therefore, in the present 
paper, we do not separate the dynamics of the rate of utilization and those of the rate of employment. 
Separate analysis will be left for future research. 
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   ppe f ˆˆˆˆ  , (15) 
where the rate of change in the price of foreign goods, fpˆ  is constant and exogenously given. 
Following Blecker and Seguino (2002) and Blecker (2011), we introduce a crawling peg 
system in regard to the nominal exchange rate: 
   0,0),(ˆ  e , (16) 
where   denotes the speed of adjustment. The currency authority has a target level of the 
real exchange rate   and adjusts the nominal exchange rate according to the gap between the 
target and the actual levels.10 We introduce this crawling peg mechanism to investigate how 
the exchange rate policy of monetary authority affects the steady state equilibrium. The target 
level of the real exchange rate affects the equilibrium value of   as well as the adjustment 
path of  . 
 Substituting equations (11) and (16) in equation (15), we obtain the following equation of 
the dynamics of the real exchange rate: 
   ]);([ˆ)(ˆ   fffp . (17) 
 
3. Dynamics of the model 
From the above analysis, the dynamics of the rate of capacity utilization, profit share, and real 
exchange rate are given as  
    )()()](1[),(  exsuuugu d  , (18) 
    )()];,([]);([)1( ugu awwff   , (19) 
    ]);([ˆ)(   fffp . (20) 
 The steady state is a situation where 0  u . We let the steady state values be 
denoted as u ,  , and  . In the following analysis, we assume that there exist steady state 
values such that 10  u , 10   , and 0 . As the numerical simulations in 
Appendix B show, such a steady state actually exists but this result depends on functional 
specifications. 
                                                 
10 According to Blecker (2011), we assume that the central bank automatically sterilizes any reserve 
inflows and outflows that are necessary to manage the nominal exchange rate, and accordingly, the money 
supply and interest rate, both are not explicitly shown in our model, are unaffected. 
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 The elements of the Jacobian matrix J  that corresponds to the system of the differential 
equations are given by 
 })()](1[{11  sgu
uJ du 
  , (21) 
 ])([12 sug
uJ d   
  , (22) 
 )}()1()({13  xesu
uJ 
  , (23) 
 )(where,)1()]()[1(21 ugugu
J awuwawuw 







 ])[1(23  

wwffJ 

















All the elements are evaluated at the steady state values. In what follows, we explain elements 
whose signs are ambiguous. 
 To conduct the analysis further, we introduce the following assumption. 
 
Assumption 1. The condition 0)()](1[   sgdu  holds. 
 
 This condition is an open economy version of the Keynesian stability condition in which we 
assume that the quantity adjustment in the goods market is stable. We then have 011 J . 
 Next, we introduce the following definition. 
 
Definition 1. We define 0)(  sugd   as the domestically wage-led demand regime and 
0)(  sugd  as the domestically profit-led demand regime. 
 
 The element 12J  shows the direct effect of an increase in the profit share on the rate of 
capacity utilization. If the sign is positive, a rise in the profit share increases domestic demand 
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directly, which we call as domestically profit-led demand case.11 If the sign is negative, a rise 
in the profit share decreases domestic demand directly, which we call as domestically 
wage-led demand case. Note here that the partial relationship between the profit share and the 
rate of capacity utilization, which is represented by 12J , differs from the overall relationship 
between them. In regard to the overall relation between the profit share and the rate of 
capacity utilization, we add the following definition. 
 
Definition 2. We call the situation where for any of the parameter changes that affect income 
distribution, the profit share and the rate of capacity utilization move in the opposite direction 
in the steady state equilibrium as the overall wage-led demand regime. On the other hand, we 
call the situation where for any of the parameter changes that affect income distribution, the 
profit share and the rate of capacity utilization move in the same direction in the steady state 
equilibrium as the overall profit-led demand regime. 
 
 In section 4, we will show the cases where the domestically wage-led demand (profit-led 
demand) regime can be compatible with the overall profit-led demand (wage-led demand) 
regime. 
 The element 13J  shows the effect of an increase in the real exchange rate on the trade 
balance (normalized by capital stock) usexTB )1)]((1[)(   . If   is more than 
unity, we have 0)(   , which leads to 013 J . This corresponds to 0/  TB , which 
means that the Marshall-Lerner condition (ML condition, hereafter) is satisfied. If   is less 
than unity, we have 0)(   , which leads to 013 J , depending on the size of 0)(  xe . 
In this case, the ML condition is not satisfied. 
 The element 21J  shows the effect of an increase in the rate of capacity utilization on the 
profit share. If the reserve army effect exceeds the reserve army creation effect, we have 
0 , leading to 021 J . This corresponds to the case where the profit share is 
counter-cyclical to the rate of capacity utilization. On the contrary, if the reserve army creation 
                                                 
11 We can rewrite equation (22) as follows:   usugJ d  112   . The first term on the 
right-hand side shows a positive effect of a rise in the profit share on the investment, the second term shows 
a negative impact of an increase in the profit share on the consumption for the domestic goods from wage 
income, and the third term shows a positive effect of a rise in the profit share on the consumption for the 
domestic goods from profit income. Thus, the term “domestically profit-led demand” denotes the case 
where a rise in the profit share increases domestic demand, and the term “domestically wage-led demand” 
denotes the case where a rise in the profit share decreases domestic demand. 
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effect exceeds the reserve army effect, we have 0 , leading to 021 J . This corresponds 
to the case where the profit share is pro-cyclical to the rate of capacity utilization. 
 The element 23J  shows the effect of an increase in the real exchange rate on the profit 
share. If firms are more responsive than workers, that is, if the absolute value of  f  is 
greater than that of  w , then 023 J . In contrast, if workers are more responsive than firms, 
that is, if the absolute value of  w  is greater than that of  f , then 023 J . If firms are 
responsive, firms bear the burden arising from international price competition more than 
workers, but if workers are more responsive, workers bear the burden arising from 
international price competition more than firms. 
 By deriving the characteristic equation that corresponds to the Jacobian matrix J  and 
examining the corresponding characteristic roots, we can investigate the local stability of the 
steady state equilibrium.12 For clarification of analysis, we use the following two assumption: 
 
Assumption 2. Both 0)(  sugd   and 0  hold. 
Assumption 3. Both 0)(  sugd   and 0  hold. 
 
 Assumption 2 corresponds to the case where the economy is in the domestically wage-led 
demand regime and the reserve army creation effect exceeds the reserve army effect. Then, we 
have both 012 J  and 021 J . Assumption 3 corresponds to the case where the economy is 
in the domestically profit-led demand regime and the reserve army effect exceeds the reserve 
army creation effect. We then have 012 J  and 021 J . 
 
Using these assumptions, we obtain the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that the effect of the real exchange rate on the trade balance is small, 
that is, the absolute value of  /TB  is small. Then, irrespective of whether or not the ML 
condition is satisfied, the combination of either the domestically wage-led demand regime and 
0  or the domestically profit-led demand regime and 0  makes the steady state 
equilibrium stable. 
 
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
                                                 




 As Appendix C shows, in a closed economy, the combination of the domestically wage-led 
demand regime and 0  (i.e., the reserve army creation effect exceeds the reserve army 
effect), or the domestically profit-led demand regime and 0  (the reserve army effect 
exceeds the reserve army creation effect) is a stability condition. In the open economy, if the 
effect of the real exchange rate on the trade balance is small, these combinations are also the 
stability conditions. 
 We also obtain the two further propositions: 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose that the effect of the real exchange rate on the trade balance is large, 
that is, the absolute value of  /TB  is large. Then, if the ML condition is satisfied, the 
combination of the domestically wage-led demand regime and 0  makes the steady state 
equilibrium unstable. On the other hand, if the ML condition is not satisfied, under the 
combination of the domestically wage-led demand regime and 0 , limit cycles occur 
when the speed of adjustment of the goods market lies within some range. 
 
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose that the effect of the real exchange rate on the trade balance is large, 
that is, the absolute value of  /TB  is large. Then, if the ML condition is satisfied, under 
the combination of the domestically profit-led demand regime and 0 , limit cycles occur 
when the speed of adjustment of the goods market lies within some range. On the other hand, 
if the ML condition is not satisfied, the combination of the domestically profit-led demand 
regime and 0  makes the steady state equilibrium unstable. 
 
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
 
 We now explain why there occur limit cycles when the speed of adjustment of the goods 
market is medium. First, when   is sufficiently close to zero, the rate of capacity utilization 
is not adjusted and the analysis of the dynamic system therefore amounts to the analysis of the 
subsystem that consists of the profit share and the real exchange rate. After some calculations, 
we find that the dynamics of the subsystem are stable. Second, when   is sufficiently large, 
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the rate of capacity utilization is adjusted immediately and the effect of the rate of capacity 
utilization on the dynamical system therefore does not last. In this case, too, the analysis of the 
dynamic system amounts to the analysis of the subsystem that consists of the profit share and 
the real exchange rate. When   takes an intermediate value, the rate of capacity utilization 
changes with lags. The rate of capacity utilization therefore has a lasting effect on the 
dynamical system and, accordingly, cyclical fluctuations occur. 
 Propositions 1, 2, and 3 are summarized in Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
4. Comparative static analysis 
This section examines the effect of changes in the saving rate of capitalists, the bargaining 
powers of firms and workers, and the target value of the real exchange rate on the steady state 
values of the rate of capital utilization, profit share, and the real exchange rate.13 Here, we 
only consider the stable steady state: Assumption 1 holds, either Assumption 2 ( 012 J  and 
021 J ) or Assumption 3 ( 012 J  and 021 J ) holds, the trade balance does not respond 
much to the real exchange rate (i.e., the absolute value of  /TB  is sufficiently small), and 
0det J  holds. In addition, we suppose here that the ML condition is always satisfied, that is, 
J13  0  holds.14 
 
4.1 Saving rate of capitalists 
We represent the effect of a change in the saving rate of capitalists on the rate of capacity 
utilization as follows: 
 








du . (30) 
Equation (30) thus means that the paradox of thrift holds even in an open economy version of 
the Kaleckian model: an increase in the saving rate of capitalists reduces the rate of capacity 
utilization. 
                                                 
13 The current analysis abstracts from the effect of the price of foreign goods on the steady state values. 
This is because, for the home country, a rise in the target value of the real exchange rate is equivalent to a 
rise in the price of foreign goods in the sense that they both produce the same results. 
14 The results of the comparative static analysis in the case where the ML condition does not hold is more 




The effects of a change in the saving rate of capitalists on the profit share and the real 















As described above, an increase in the saving rate of capitalists decreases the rate of capacity 
utilization. When the reserve army creation effect exceeds the reserve army effect ( 021 J ), a 
decline in the rate of capacity utilization reduces labor productivity growth and thus the profit 
share ( 0/  dsd ). Furthermore, a fall in the profit share decreases the real exchange rate 
( 0/  dsd ) because a loss of profitability urges capitalists to raise the price of domestic 
goods. 
On the other hand, if the reserve army effect is stronger than the reserve army creation 
effect ( 021 J ), a rise in the saving rate of capitalists leads to a rise in the profit share 
( 0/  dsd ). This is because a fall in the rate of capacity utilization decelerates nominal 
wage growth. An increase in profitability, moreover, leaves room for lowering the price of 
domestic goods. Consequently, an increase in the saving rate of capitalists raises the real 
exchange rate ( 0/  dsd ). 
 
4.2 Bargaining powers of firms and workers 
The next task is to investigate the effects of the bargaining power of firms and workers on the 
steady state values of the key endogenous variables. Because it is difficult to derive purely 
analytical results from our model, we here confine ourselves to pointing out that the 
propositions obtained in a closed version of a Kaleckian model may not be applied to an open 
economy case. 
 We represent an effect of an increase in the firms’ bargaining power on the rate of capacity 










As Appendix C shows, in a closed economy, a rise in the bargaining power of firms has a 
strictly positive impact on the rate of capacity utilization under a domestically profit-led 
demand regime. In an open economy, however, this may not occur.  
Assume that the rate of capacity utilization is domestically profit-led ( 012 J ). The first 
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and second terms on the right-hand side of equation (33) are thus positive, whereas the third 
and fourth terms are negative if 023 J . If the latter effects are larger than the former effects, 
a rise in the bargaining power of firms reduces the rate of capacity utilization even under the 
domestically profit-led demand regime. The story behind such a situation is explained as 
follows. An increase in the firms’ bargaining power puts upward pressure on the price of 
domestic goods, which in turn leads to a decline in the real exchange rate. A direct effect of a 
decrease in the real exchange rate is that it worsens the trade balance and the rate of capacity 
utilization (the third term); its indirect effect is that it reduces the profit share and thus shrinks 
domestic demand under the domestically profit-led demand regime if firms bear the burden 
arising from international price competition more than workers (the fourth term). 
The effect of an increase in the workers’ bargaining power on the rate of capacity utilization 










A well-known implication of equation (34) is that it is hard to allow workers to strengthen 
their bargaining power in an open economy.15 The first (negative) term on the right-hand side 
of equation (34) implies that an increase in the workers’ bargaining power reduces firms’ 
profitability and forces firms to push up the price of domestic goods; a rise in the price of 
domestic goods, in turn, decreases the rate of capacity utilization by deteriorating terms of 
trade. This gives a reason to justify weakening the bargaining power of workers that confront 
international price competition, irrespective of which demand regime is realized. 
 Next, we represent the impact of a change in the firms’ bargaining power on the profit 










It is likely that an increase in the bargaining power of firms raises the profit share, but the 
result is not so simple in an open economy framework. For instance, if w  is sufficiently 
small, we have 021 J  and 023 J , both the second and third terms on the right-hand side 
of equation (35) show a negative sign, which implies that there exists a possibility of 
increasing bargaining power of firms reducing the profit share. Strengthening its bargaining 
                                                 
15 This point is stressed by Blecker (2011) and Cassetti (2012). They show that cutting down a mark-up rate 
of domestic goods as well as decreasing nominal wage causes higher growth under the domestically 
wage-led demand case in an open economy. 
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power raises the price of domestic goods and decreases the real exchange rate. A decline in the 
real exchange rate, in turn, leads to decreases in the rate of capacity utilization. If the 
adjustment speed of the nominal wage is sufficiently slow, then the reserve army creation 
effect becomes larger than the reserve army effect, and the profit share decreases (the second 
term). Also, if the adjustment speed of the nominal wage is sufficiently slow, then firms bear 
the burden arising from international price competition more than workers, and the profit 
share decreases (the third term). 











 . (36) 
Irrespective of the sign of 23J , the right-hand side of equation (36) is necessarily negative. In 
other words, irrespective of whether or not firms are more responsive than workers, 
strengthening workers’ bargaining power decreases the profit share. This is because an 
increase in workers’ bargaining power   decreases their target profit share w , which has a 
negative impact on the profit share. 












Under either Assumption 2 or Assumption 3, the sign of the first term on the right-hand side of 
equation (37) is negative, whereas the sign of the second term is positive. The result is 
therefore ambiguous. 











 . (38) 
Equation (38) shows that an increase in the workers’ bargaining power reduces firms’ 
profitability and firms push up the price of domestic goods, which in turn decreases the real 
exchange rate. 
 
4.3 Target value of the real exchange rate 
Governments often seek to raise the real exchange rate (devalue the currency) with the 
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intention of improving the trade balance and stimulating output and employment. To begin 
with, we consider the effect of an increase in the target value of the exchange rate on its own 
steady state value: 









 . (39) 
Because 0/   dd  is obtained from 021122211  JJJJ , raising the target value of the real 
exchange rate increases its steady-state value. As mentioned above, if the ML condition is 
satisfied, we have 013 J , and hence, 0 TB . Therefore, when governments devalue 
their home currencies, the trade balance is necessarily improved because of a rise in the real 
exchange rate. 
However, even if the trade balance is improved, the rate of capacity utilization does not 
necessarily increase. Next, we investigate whether the attempt to depreciate the exchange rate 










The sign of the first term on the right-hand side of equation (40) is positive, which implies that 
a rise in the real exchange rate improves the trade balance, whereas the sign of the second 
term is ambiguous. The depreciation policy therefore may not work. The story behind the 
failure of that policy is explained as follows. 
Suppose that the economy exhibits a domestically profit-led demand regime ( 012 J ) and 
workers are more responsive to the change of the real exchange rate than firms ( 023 J ). 
Under these assumptions, the sign of the second term on the right-hand side of equation (40) is 
negative. A rise in the real exchange rate caused by the depreciation policy stimulates foreign 
demand as long as the ML condition is satisfied (the first term). At the same time, the 
depreciation policy triggers workers to demand a higher nominal wage, which causes a decline 
in the profit share and stagnation of domestic demand. The total effect is therefore ambiguous. 
To succeed in the depreciation policy under the domestically profit-led demand regime, it is 
necessary for firms to bear the burden arising from international price competition. 
Next, we assume that the domestically wage-led demand regime is realized ( 012 J ) and 
firms are more responsive to the change of the real exchange rate than workers ( 023 J ). In 
this case, the currency depreciation may not work because the sign of second term is negative. 
A rise in the real exchange rate increases the profit share by increasing the price of domestic 
goods, which in turn causes a decline in domestic demand. Under a domestically wage-led 
20 
 
demand regime, the nominal wage must therefore rise higher than the price of domestic goods 
to stimulate aggregate demand by means of the depreciation policy. 











If the reserve army creation effect is stronger than the reserve army effect, the depreciation 
policy raises the rate of capacity utilization by improving the trade balance, and increases the 
profit share (i.e., the sign of the first term on the right-hand sided of equation (41) is positive). 
On the other hand, if the reserve army effect is stronger than the reserve army creation effect, 
the policy decreases the profit share (i.e., the sign of the first term is negative). 
In addition, when firms are more responsive to the change of the real exchange rate than 
workers, the depreciation policy raises the price of domestic goods and increases the profit 
share (i.e., the sign of the second term is positive). When workers are more responsive, 
however, this policy reduces the profit share through higher nominal wage growth (i.e., the 
sign of the second term is positive). 
 
4.4 Summary 
Table 1 shows the results of comparative static analysis in the case where the domestically 
wage-led demand regime is realized and the reserve army creation effect is larger than the 
reserve army effect, while Table 2 shows the results of the case in which the domestically 
profit-led demand regime is realized and the reserve army effect is larger than the reserve 
army creation effect. 
Let us review the key points obtained from our analysis. 
First, the paradox of thrift holds even in the open economy Kaleckian model. 
Second, to succeed in a depreciation policy for stimulating aggregate demand, it is 
necessary for the government to consider both the demand regime in the domestic economy 
and who bears more of the burden of international price competition, workers or firms. 
Third, the domestic relation between the profit share and the rate of capacity utilization 
differs from the overall relation between them. For instance, as Table 2 shows, a rise in the 
bargaining power of firms may increase the profit share and decrease the rate of capacity 
utilization under the domestically profit-led demand regime, which implies that a domestically 
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profit-led demand regime can be compatible with an overall wage-led demand regime. Thus, 
the domestic demand regime is not sufficient to tell us whose bargaining power should be 
raised to increase aggregate demand. Moreover, the overall regime is merely a consequence of 
comparative static analysis with regard to the parameter changes that affect income 
distribution. Therefore, we should concentrate on the effects of the bargaining powers of firms 
and workers on the rate of capacity utilization rather than the domestic and /or overall demand 
regime. In what follows, we compare our results with regard to the bargaining power with 
those of Blecker (2011) and Cassetti (2012).16 
 In Blecker (2011), a decrease in the target profit share of workers decreases the steady state 
value of the profit share but has an ambiguous effect on the steady state value of the rate of 
capacity utilization under the domestically wage-led demand regime. Furthermore, under this 
regime, a decrease in the degree of the market share of the firm (i.e., a decline in the price of 
domestic goods) decreases the profit share but increases the rate of capacity utilization in the 
steady state equilibrium. Thus, Blecker (2011) obtains 0or0/  wddu   and 
0/  fddu  . 
 Cassetti (2012) also assumes a domestically wage-led growth regime. In this situation, a 
domestically wage-led demand regime holds if the Keynesian stability condition is satisfied. A 
decrease in the target value of the profit share of workers decreases the steady state value of 
the rate of capital accumulation, and an increase in the target profit share of firms has negative 
impact on the steady-state value of the rate of capital accumulation (i.e., 0/  wddg   and 
0/  fddg  ). 
In our model, a decrease in the bargaining power of workers is represented by an increase in 
w  while an increase in the bargaining power of firms is represented by a rise in f . If we 
assume the domestically wage-led demand regime, we have 0or0/  wddu   and 
0or0/  fddu  . This is because the effect of a change in the bargaining power on the rate 
of capacity utilization depends on which domestic demand regime is realized and which 
agents, firms or workers, bear more of the burden arising from international price competition. 
Depending on the combination of these two factors, there exist various scenarios that might 
unfold under international competition. 
                                                 
16 In the following discussion, we change the notations of Blecker (2011) and Cassetti (2012) into ours. 
Cassetti (2012) considers raw material imports, whereas we do not because our aim is to investigate the 
effect of international competition on the wage bargaining (especially on the target profit shares of workers 
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5 Conclusions 
This paper has presented an open economy Kaleckian model, considering the process in which 
international price competition affects wage bargaining between firms and workers and the 
effect of such bargaining on the stability of the equilibrium and the steady-state values of the 
endogenous variables. In particular, the analysis shows that some of the propositions obtained 
from a closed economy Kaleckian model do not hold in an open economy model, and even 
some previous results from open economy Kaleckian models are overturned or shown to be 
special cases. Our results can be summarized as follows. 
Stability analysis. (1) The stability conditions in the closed economy case (i.e., the 
combination of either the domestically wage-led demand regime and a larger reserve army 
creation effect or the domestically profit-led demand regime and a larger reserve army effect) 
are accepted in the open economy case where a change in the real exchange rate has a small 
impact on the trade balance. (2) By contrast, if a change in the real exchange rate has a larger 
impact on the trade balance, the steady state becomes unstable. (3) Moreover, if the ML 
condition is satisfied under the combination of the domestically profit-led demand regime and 
a larger reserve army effect, limit cycles occur as long as the speed of adjustment of the goods 
market lies within some range. 
Comparative static analysis. (4) The paradox of thrift is true even in the open economy 
setting. (5) Strengthening the firms’ bargaining power may depress an economy that exhibits a 
domestically profit-led demand regime, but may not reduce the rate of capacity utilization 
under a domestically wage-led demand regime. We therefore conclude that not only the 
domestic demand regimes but also which agents, firms or workers, bear the burden arising 
from international price competition determines the effect of the bargaining power on the 
aggregate demand. (6) Furthermore, the success of a depreciation policy for stimulating output 
and employment depends on how to spread the burden of international price competition 
between firms and workers as well as the demand regime. 
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Appendix A: Stability analysis and proofs of propositions 




3  aqaqaq , (A1) 
where q  denotes a characteristic root. The coefficients of equation (A1) are given by 
 0)(tr 3322111  JJJa J , (A2) 
 )()()( 211222113311322333222 JJJJJJJJJJa  , (A3) 
 )()(det 321333122132233322113 JJJJJJJJJJa  J , (A4) 
where Jtr  denotes the trace of J  and Jdet  the determinant of J . 
 The necessary and sufficient conditions for the local stability of the steady state equilibrium 
are given by 01 a , 02 a , 03 a , and 0321  aaa . We investigate whether or not these 
conditions are satisfied. In our model, the coefficients of the characteristic equation are linear 
functions of  , the speed of adjustment of u , and hence, 321 aaa   is a quadratic function 
of  , where17 
 211  a , (A5) 
 432  a , (A6) 
 53 a , (A7) 
 4253241
2
31321 )()()(  faaa . (A8) 
In the following analysis, we explain the coefficients 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , and 5 . 
 To begin with, the signs of 1 , 2 , and 4  are immediately obtained as 
   0)()](1[1  dugs , (A9) 
   0)()1)((2   ffwf , (A10) 
   0)]())[(1(4    wfwfwf . (A11) 
01   is obtained from Assumption 1, and 04   is obtained from both 0 f  and 
                                                 
17 We use the fact that the speed of adjustment of the goods market   affects the dynamic process of the 
model but not the steady state values. 
24 
 
0 w . 
 Next, the coefficient 3  can be expressed as 
  ])()[1()]()1)(}[()()](1{[3 suggs dffwfdu   .(A12) 
From this, if Assumption 2 holds, that is, 0)(  sugd   and 0  hold, we have 
03  , and if Assumption 3 holds, that is, 0)(  sugd   and 0  hold, we also have 
03  . 















The first line of the right-hand side of equation (A13) is always positive. Let us focus on the 
second line. 
 First, when Assumption 2 holds and the ML condition is satisfied, the sign of the second 
line depends on the absolute size of the following term: 
 )]()1()([  xesuf  . (A14) 
If expression (A14) is small, we have 05  , leading to 03 a . This effect is small when 
0)(    is small and 0)(  xe  is small, that is, when the expenditure coefficient for 
domestic goods is not so responsive to the real exchange rate and when export demand is not 
so responsive to the real exchange rate. In other words, when the trade balance is not so 
responsive to the real exchange rate, then 0/  TB  is small. By contrast, if Assumption 2 
holds and the ML condition is not satisfied, 05   necessarily holds. 
 Second, when Assumption 3 holds and the ML condition is satisfied, 05   necessarily 
holds. By contrast, when Assumption 3 holds and the ML condition is not satisfied, we have 
05   as long as the absolute value of 0/  TB  is small, which is to say, close to zero. 
 Finally, we investigate the sign of 53241  . If the sign is positive, we always 
have 0321  aaa . On the other hand, if the sign is negative and its absolute value is large, 





















 When Assumption 2 holds and the ML condition is satisfied, the second line of equation 
(A15) is always positive and hence, we have 053241  , leading to 0321  aaa . 
By contrast, when Assumption 2 holds and the ML condition is not satisfied, we have 
053241   as long as the absolute value of 0/  TB  is small, which is to say, 
close to zero. 
 When Assumption 3 holds and the ML condition is satisfied, we have 
053241   if 0/  TB  is small because the second line is positive. By 
contrast, when Assumption 3 holds and the ML condition is not satisfied, 
053241   necessarily holds. 
 
A.1 Proof of proposition 1 
Irrespective of the sign of  /TB , if the absolute value of  /TB  is small, we have 
05   and 053241  . From this, we have 01 a , 02 a , 03 a , and 
0321  aaa . All the necessary and sufficient conditions are therefore satisfied. 
 
A.2 Proof of proposition 2 
First part: If 0/  TB  is large, we have 05   and 053241  . Then, we 
have 01 a , 02 a , 03 a , and 0321  aaa , which means that one condition is not 
satisfied. The steady state equilibrium is therefore unstable. 
Second part: If the absolute value of 0/  TB  is large, we have 05   and 
053241  . If the absolute value of 053241   is large, it is possible 
that the sign of 4253241
2
31 )()()(  f  alternates. The quadratic 
function )(f  is convex downwards and its intercept is positive. If the discriminant of 
0)( f  is positive, the equation 0)( f  has two positive real roots: for ),0( 1  , we 
have 01 a , 02 a , 03 a , and 0321  aaa ; for ),( 21   , we have 01 a , 02 a , 
03 a , and 0321  aaa ; and for 2  , we have 01 a , 02 a , 03 a , and 
0321  aaa . There thus occurs the Hopf bifurcation at 1   and 2  . Indeed, at 
1   and 2  , we have 01 a , 02 a , 03 a , 0321  aaa , and 
0/)(
21 or321
  aaa , which mean that all the conditions for the Hopf bifurcation are 
satisfied. There therefore exists a continuous family of non-constant, periodic solutions of the 




A.3 Proof of proposition 3 
First part: If 0/  TB  is large, we have 04   and 053241  . When the 
absolute value of 053241   is large, it is possible that the sign of 
4253241
2
31 )()()(  f  alternates. The quadratic function )(f  is 
convex downwards and its intercept is positive. If the discriminant of 0)( f  is positive, 
the equation 0)( f  has two positive real roots: for ),0( 1  , we have 01 a , 02 a , 
03 a , and 0321  aaa ; for ),( 21   , we have 01 a , 02 a , 03 a , and 
0321  aaa ; and for 2  , we have 01 a , 02 a , 03 a , and 0321  aaa . There 
thus occurs the Hopf bifurcation at 1   and 2  . Indeed, at 1   and 2  , we 
have 01 a , 02 a , 03 a , 0321  aaa , and 0/)(
21 or321
  aaa , which means 
that all the conditions for the Hopf bifurcation are satisfied. There therefore exists a 
continuous family of non-constant, periodic solutions of the system around 1   and 
2  . 
Second part: If the absolute value of 0/  TB  is large, we have 05   and 
053241  . We then have 01 a , 02 a , 03 a , and 0321  aaa , which 
means that one condition is not satisfied. The steady state equilibrium is therefore unstable. 
 
Appendix B: Numerical simulations 
Using numerical simulations, we show that the Hopf bifurcation actually occurs. For this 
purpose, we have to specify functional forms. 
Investment function: 0,10,0, 2100 21   ugd . (B1) 
Here, following Blecker (2002) and Sasaki (2010), we use the Cobb-Douglas investment 
function. Roughly speaking, the parametric restriction 10 2    corresponds to the 
domestically wage-led demand regime while 12   corresponds to the domestically 
profit-led demand regime. 
Firms’ target profit share: 0,10, 1010   f , (B2) 
Workers’ target profit share: 0,0,10, 210210   uw , (B3) 
Labor productivity growth: 0,  uga , (B4) 
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Expenditure coefficient:     0,0,)( 010 BB   , the elasticity of 
substitution, (B5) 
Export demand function:    0,0,)( 00 AAex   , the price elasticity of 
export demand. (B6) 
In what follows, we present a numerical example that corresponds to the case where 0 , 
the economy is in the domestically profit-led demand regime, and 0/  TB  is large. First, 
we set the parameters as follows: 
7.0s , 2.00  , 2.01  , 7.12  , 3.00  , 01.02  , 3.00  , 2.01  , 
01.02  , 4.00 A , 1500 , 3.0f , 7.0w , 01.0 , 1 , 1 , 01.0fp , 
3.00 B , 150 . 
In this numerical example, the open economy version of the Keynesian stability condition 
holds, workers are more responsive than firms, the two endogenously determined target profit 
shares are more than zero and less than unity, the inequality wf    holds, and the 
endogenously determined expenditure share is 1)(0   . 
 We set initial conditions to 15.0)0( u , 25.0)0( m , and 98.0)0(  . As figure B1 
shows, there exist two Hopf bifurcation points. 
 
 
Figure B1: Existence of two Hopf bifurcation points 
 
 Using 1  as the speed of adjustment of the goods market, we obtain the following 
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figures with regard to the time series of the endogenous variables (figures B2-B5). 
 
 
Figure B2: Dynamics of the capacity utilization 
 
Figure B3: Dynamics of the profit share 
 




Figure B5: Dynamics of the trade balance 
 
Appendix C: Closed economy model 
We briefly explain the closed economy model, which is a model that removes import and 
export demand as well as the effect of the real exchange rate from the open economy model. 
In this case, the dynamics of the rate of capacity utilization and the profit share are as follows:  
 }),({  suugu d  , (C1) 
 )}()];([])([){1( ugu awwff   . (C2) 
The steady state equilibrium is given by 0 u . 
 The elements of the Jacobian matrix are given by 
 )(11  sgJ du  , (C3) 
 )(12 sugJ d   , (C4) 
  )1()]();()[1(21  uguJ aww , (C5) 
 0)1)((22   wfJ . (C6) 
All the elements are evaluated at the steady sate equilibrium values. 
 Similar to the open economy model, we use the following three assumptions. 
Assumption 1’. 0 sgdu . 
Assumption 2’. 0 sugd  and 0 . 
Assumption 3’. 0 sugd  and 0 . 
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 From assumption 1’, we have 0tr J . The determinant is given by 
 ])())()[(1(det  suggsJ dduwf  . (C7) 
Under assumption 2’, we have 0det J . In addition, under assumption 3’, we have 0det J . 
If assumptions 1’ and 2’ hold simultaneously or if assumptions 1’ and 3’ hold simultaneously, 
we have both 0tr J  and 0det J , which thus satisfies the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the local stability of the equilibrium. 
  We investigate the effects of exogenous increases in   (i.e., the bargaining power of 
firms) and   (i.e., the bargaining power of workers) on the equilibrium rate of capacity 















 . (C9) 
We have that 0det J  from the stability condition. Then, if 0 sugd , we have 
0/  ddu  and 0/  ddu , and if 0 sugd , we have 0/  ddu  and 
0/  ddu . Consequently, if the economy is in the profit-led demand regime, an increase in 
the bargaining power of firms and an increase in the bargaining power of workers increases 
and decreases the rate of capacity utilization, respectively. Whereas if the economy is in the 
wage-led demand regime, an increase in the bargaining power of firms and an increase in the 
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Figure and Tables 
 
 
Figure 1: Diagram of stability analysis 
 
Table 1: Results for comparative static analysis under the domestically wage-led demand 
regime and 0  
 u      
s        
    or     or      or   
    or       
    or      or     
 
Table 2: Results for comparative static analysis under the domestically profit-led demand 
regime and 0  
 u      
s        
    or      or     or   
        
    or     or      
 
